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Abstract 
Degressive proportionality is an intermediary solution between equality and proportionality. Taking this fact into 
account, the article proposes a measure of degression of the degressively proportional division. The defined  
measure was used, among other instances, in allocation based on classical proposals of seat distribution in European 
Parliament by Pukelsheim and Ramirez as well as the distribution of seats during the Parliamentary term of 2014-
2019. The outcome is confronted with other measures functioning in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of degressive proportionality has been widely disseminated as a result of problems with its 
interpretation in the course of work on the construction of the composition of the European Parliament. The 
principle of degressive proportionality is included in the Lisbon Treaty, as a method of determining the number of 
representations of the Member States of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced major changes in 
this regard to the Treaty on the European Union. Submitted Article 9a, the second point is the following: 
The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed 
seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, 
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with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-
six seats. 
Work on the interpretation of the principle of degressive proportionality has been entrusted to the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs, which in the draft resolution of the Parliament (Lamassoure & Severin, 2007) concluded that: 
Considers that the principle of degressive proportionality means that the ratio between the population and the 
number of seats of each Member State must vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each 
Member from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member from a less populous 
Member State and conversely, but also that no less populous Member State has more seats than a more populous 
Member State. 
This provision was included in the resolution of the European Parliament (INI/2007 / 2169). Article 1 of the 
resolution reads as follows: 
The principle of degressive proportionality provided for in Article [9a] of the Treaty on European Union shall be 
applied as follows: 
• the minimum and maximum numbers set by the Treaty must be fully utilised to ensure that the allocation of 
seats in the European Parliament reflects as closely as possible the range of populations of the Member 
States; 
• the larger the population of a country, the greater its entitlement to a large number of seats; 
• the larger the population of a country, the more inhabitants are represented by each of its Members of the 
European Parliament. 
In many studies regarding the distribution of seats in the European Parliament among Member States there are 
different terms used relating to the degree of degression of the given allocation or the method by which the division 
is carried out. For example, in the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the composition of the 
European Parliament with a view to the elections in 2014 (Gualtieri & Trzaskowski, 2013), which initiated the 
distribution of seats in the Parliament's eighth term of office appears to say that among the various possible 
mathematical formulae for implementing the principle of degressive proportionality 
1, the ‘parabolic’ method is one 
of the most degressive. The authors of the report do not present arguments that could justify such an opinion, they 
referred only to the attachment of the document which presents the method of parabolic distribution. 
The thesis skating that the parabolic method is the most degressive can be validated on the basis of strictly 
mathematical argumentation. Degressive proportionality is a deviation from proportion in the direction of equality. 
Proportional division is based on a linear allocation function, whereas equal division uses a constant function for the 
same purpose. One may regard as the most degressive an allocation, which allocation function diminishes at a 
steady pace. The only function with a derivative that is constant and different than zero is a square function. 
This paper proposes a method for measuring the degree of degression of a given allocation. The values assigned 
to the challengers to the shared good will be marked with symbols p1, p2,…, pn, and numbers of goods attributed to 
them s1, s2,…, sn. Although, the discussion will be depicted with the case of distribution of seats in the European 
Parliament, they are general in nature. 
 
2. Measures of degressive proportionality 
Geometric interpretation of degressive proportionality is shown in Figure 1. Sections with the start in the point 
(0,0) and ends in the points (pi, si) must have a decreasing inclination angle to the x-axis . It is known that, assuming 
pi > 0, si > 0 the sufficient condition of degressive proportionality is concavity of the polygonal chain with vertices 
(pi, si) (Dniestrzański, 2011a). It is not, however, as shown in Figure 1, a necessary condition. Determination of 
degressive proportionality cannot contain the requirement of concavity of polygonal chain with vertices (pi, si) as the 
same number of seats for two countries with different populations would force the same number of seats for all 
subsequent Member States with population of at least the same quantity. 
 
 
1 For an analysis and a description of the various mathematical formulae, see the Special Issue of ‘Mathematical Social Sciences’, 63 (2012), 
pp. 65–191, especially Table 2, on p. 100. 
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DEGRESSIVE PROPORTIONALITY
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Fig.1. Degressive proportionality  
Determining methods of measuring the degression of a given division or an algorithm to obtain it can be of great 
importance for precise usage of this allocation. In his work Łyko (Łyko, 2013) shows two different ways of 
measuring the degression of the division. The first, called the boundary measure, is based solely on boundary 
conditions 2 of a given allocation. Łyko proposed as a measure of degression the value 
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The value UB belongs to the range [–1,1] and equality UB = 0 holds if and only if the considered distribution is 
proportional. Therefore, this measure is a numerical representation of the deviation from proportionality. 
Second way of measuring the degression of the distribution proposed by the Łyko is based on the value of the 
expression  
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N0 is a set of those i for which the value ui is defined. 
The value 
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U  is called internal measure of degressive proportionality. He also proposes calling the value 
0
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= ∑  global measure of degressive proportionality. 
Another possibility of construction of the measure of degressive proportionality is presented by the result shown 
in the work by (Florek, 2012). Florek demonstrated the equivalence of the two following definitions of degressively 
proportional sequences. 
 
 
2 The boundary conditions mean minimum and maximum number of seats that must be granted and the total number of seats. Influence of 
conditions boundary on the possible distribution of seats is further analyzed in the work (Łyko, 2012). 
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Definition 1 (Florek, 2012) 
The sequence S = (s1, s2,…, sn), where is N∈  is degressively proportional with respect to the sequence P = (p1, 
p2,…, pn), if and only if: 1 2 ... ns s s≥ ≥ ≥  and 
1 2
1 2
...
n
n
pp p
s s s
≥ ≥ ≥ . 
Definition 2 (Florek, 2012) 
Let (pi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n  be a fixed non-increasing sequence of positive real numbers ( 1 2 ... 0np p p≥ ≥ ≥ > ) and x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  
is rounding the number x  up to the nearest integer. Sequence of natural numbers (Si), 1 ≤ i ≤ n is degressively 
proportional with respect to the sequence (pi), if and only if 
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for a certain sequence ai ≥ 0; 2 ≤ i ≤ n and certain M N∈  constant. 
Definition 1 is passive in nature – it allows checking whether the sequence S is degressively proportional with 
relation to the sequence P, but does not specify the algorithm for constructing such sequences. Definition 2 has a 
constructive character, but does not allow direct determination whether a sequence S is degressively proportional 
with respect to the sequence P. An additional sequence (ai) introduced to definition 2 can be the basis for 
constructing the measure of degression of distribution. For example, for a2 = a3 = … = an = 0 we get a proportional 
distribution with the obtained values rounded up to the nearest integer, whereas for sufficiently large values of a2, 
a3,…an we obtain equal distribution. In order to obtain a sequence (si) of constant degression
3 one should , while 
determining the values a2, a3,…an, take into account the values of the sequence (pi). 
3. Overview of selected methods of allocation of seats in European Parliament  
Since the onset of the European Parliament the allocation of seats among Member States was not proportional. 
Detailed analysis of the composition of the consecutive term shows that, although it is not required by any legal act, 
distribution of seats in a number of parliamentary terms was in line with the principle of degressive proportionality, 
that is, increasing the ratio of population and seats with the increase in the population of each country. This principle 
was apparently intuitively natural alternative in the absence of the possibility of applying proportional distribution. 
Precise adjustment became necessary when there was rapid development of the Union4. The principle of degressive 
proportionality with its wide range of possible interpretations had to be clarified. Among number of proposals of 
algorithms for allocation of seats that have been proposed by mathematicians, economists and politicians, the most 
commonly mentioned are: a parabolic method by Ramirez and the method of shifted proportionality (Fix + prop 
apportionment) by Pukelsheim. Ramírez González (2007) proposed the usage of quadratic function in the process of 
distribution of parliamentary seats. He showed that for the population in 2007 and 27 Member States each function 
2
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−
, for [ ]0.00143257,0.0015003c∈ , used as an allocation function gives the same 
distribution of seats. The parabolic method can be used in case of fluctuating populations and number of Member 
States.  
This method is also mentioned by (Martinez-Aroza & Ramirez, 2008) and (Ramirez, Polomares, & Marquez, 2006). 
A different approach was proposed by Pukelsheim (2010). He presented a very simple and natural design, which 
he called a shifted proportionality (Fix + prop apportionment). In a nutshell, the idea of shifted proportionality is 
as follows: 
 
 
3 The constant degression can be understood as the decline in the growth rate of the sequence s1, s2,… sn proportional to the increase in the 
value of the sequence p1, p2,… pn. 
4 In 2004 as a result of the accession of 10 new members, the biggest enlargement of EU in the history took place. The number of Member 
States increased from 15 to 25. 
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Each Member state receives 6 seats and the remaining ones are distributed proportionally. 
In case of a Community comprising 28 member states, after dividing 28 6 168× = seats, the rest of the available 
583 seats is distributed proportionally taking into consideration the requirement of the Lisbon Treaty that none of 
the member states will be given more than 96 seats. 
Pukelsheim's shifted proportionality became the basis for the most serious proposals to solve the problem of the 
allocation of seats called the Cambridge Compromise (Grimmett et al. 2011). It has been presented as a result of a 
symposium of mathematicians whose meeting was held at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences of University of 
Cambridge, on 28–29 January 2011. One of the differences with respect to the adoption of Pukelsheim's methods 
was that each Member State shall be given 5 seats at the start, which is called the basis, and the rest of the pot is 
divided proportionally rounding up the resulting values to the nearest integer. Additionally, the further details were 
devised so as the adopted solution could be used for an extended period of time. The symposium agreed on the 
manner of determining the base number of mandates in the future, depending on the number of Member States. The 
presented paper included a proposal of distribution of seats during the eighth term of the European Parliament. The 
distribution algorithm contained in the report from the meeting has been called Base+prop method. A detailed 
analysis and discussion of findings from the Cambridge Compromise can be found in the articles (Dniestrzański, 
2011b) and (Grimmett, 2012). Cambridge Compromise has been rejected as a way to structure the composition of 
the European Parliament in the eighth term, but it still appears in many official documents of the Community as a 
valuable concept. An in-depth mathematical analysis of degressive proportionality and examples of other structural 
divisions can be found in the article (Słomczyński & Życzkowski, 2012). A precise algorithm for setting up 
degressively proportional distribution with any boundary conditions is provided in the article (Łyko & Rudek, 2013). 
4. Newly proposed measure for degressive proportionality 
Degressively proportional division is an intermediary solution between the equal and proportional divisions. It 
has been proposed that the design of the measure will be based on this fact. 
Let contenders for the goods are characterized by numbers p1, p2,…, pn, where p1 ≥ p2 ≥… ≥pn > 0. Values pi are 
the basis for the allocation of the said goods si, the quantity of which is limited and equals H . Let us introduce the 
following designations: 
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The MD(S) ratio assumes values in the range of [0,1]. The closer the value of this coefficient is to 0, the closer it 
is to proportional distribution. Accordingly, shifting the value MD(S) in the direction 1 shows a greater equality of 
distribution. The values MD(S) = 0 and MD(S) = 1 are considered extreme cases which can be obtained in the case 
of proportional and equal distributions, respectively. It is also believed that the greater the value of MD(S) is 
equivalent to a larger degression of distribution S. Thus, degression will be understood as a deviation from 
proportionality in the direction of equality. 
The defined MD factor will now be used to assess the degree of degression of the selected divisions of seats in 
the European Parliament among the Member States of the European Union. The analysis will cover five allocations. 
They are, in order: 
1. Approved by the European Parliament distribution of seats in the Parliament during the term  between 2014-
2019 (column F, Table 1.). 
2. Distribution obtained with the use of Base + prop method proposed in Cambridge Compromise, based on the 
shifted proportionality (Fix + prop) by Pukelsheim (column C). 
3. Distribution obtained using the parabolic method by Ramirez (column D). 
4. Distribution obtained using the method of shifted root (Fix + root) (Dniestrzański, 2013) (column E). 
5. Purely proportional distribution (column G). 
The figures for the distributions 1–3 were taken from the resolution of the European Parliament (Gualtieri & 
Trzaskowski, 2013). Distribution 4 was obtained using the allocation functions 0,91( ) 5 0,000005719f x x= + ⋅ and 
rounding up the obtained values to the nearest integer. The method called shifted root (Fix+root), was developed by 
the author – a lecture titled: The proposal of allocation of seats in the European Parliament - the shifted root was 
presented at the 12th International Symposium in Management: Challenges and Innovation in Management and 
Leadership, and an article which will serve as written record of the lecture is in print. 
The figures regarding the population of the Member States as of 1 January 2012 were taken from the study 
(Gualtieri & Trzaskowski, 2013.) 
Table 1 shows the values for the MD ratio for the above allocations. Values of the first four distributions are in 
the range [ ]0.2095,0.2837 . The highest value of the coefficient is obtained for the distribution of 2014-2019, and the 
lowest for the division Base+prop. The obtained results allow the classification of the concerned distributions as per 
the degree of degression understood as a location between equal and proportional distribution. Columns of the 
Table 1 containing analyzed allocations were ordered based on the value of the measure MD5. As one would expect 
most proportionate distribution (with the lowest MD value) turns out to be the Base + prop division. Though this is 
not a strictly proportional distribution, its design seems to be the most natural and closest to the idea of proportional 
distributions, taking into account the boundary conditions. The most distant from proportionality (MD = 0.2867) is 
the distribution of 2014–2019. It can be regarded at the same time as a distribution which is the closest (among the 
analyzed) to an equal distribution and is the most degressive. 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 With the exclusion of proportional distribution which despite the lowest value of the SD measure was placed in the last column. This 
distribution is only a point of reference for the other analyzed distributions. 
6 Taking into consideration an assumption that the bigger the deviation from proportion, the bigger the degression of the distribution. 
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Table 1. SD measures of the chosen allocations of seats in the European Parliament 
A B C D E F G 
Member State Population 2012 Base+prop Ramirez Fix+root 2014-2019 Proportional
Germany 81843743 96 96 96 96 121 
France 65397912 83 80 79 74 97 
United Kingdom 62989550 80 78 77 73 93 
Italy 60820764 78 75 74 73 90 
Spain 46196276 61 60 59 54 68 
Poland 38538447 51 51 50 51 57 
Romania 21355849 31 32 31 32 32 
Netherlands 16730348 25 26 26 26 25 
Greece 11290935 19 20 20 21 17 
Belgium 11041266 18 19 20 21 16 
Portugal 10541840 18 19 19 21 16 
Czech Republic 10505445 18 19 19 21 16 
Hungary 9957731 17 18 18 21 15 
Sweden 9482855 17 17 18 19 14 
Austria 8443018 16 16 16 19 12 
Bulgaria 7327224 15 15 15 17 11 
Denmark 5580516 12 13 13 13 8 
Slovakia 5404322 12 12 13 13 8 
Finland 5401267 12 12 13 13 8 
Ireland 4582769 11 11 12 11 7 
Croatia 4398150 11 11 11 11 7 
Lithuania 3007758 9 9 10 11 4 
Slovenia 2055496 8 8 8 8 3 
Latvia 2041763 8 8 8 8 3 
Estonia 1339662 7 7 7 6 2 
Cyprus 862011 6 7 7 6 1 
Luxembourg 524853 6 6 6 6 1 
Malta 416110 6 6 6 6 1 
Total 508077880 751 751 751 751 751 
MD  0.2095 0.2323 0.2474 0.2837 0.0087 
Source. Own calculations 
For comparison, column G of the table shows the proportional distribution concerning the roundings to the 
nearest integer. This comparison gives a more complete picture of the deviation of the distribution from proportion, 
due to the fact that the necessity to allocate total values excludes (except very improbable situations) the possibility 
of obtaining a pure proportion. Although, the factor for the distribution in column G is close to zero. Of course, 
because of the failure to fulfill boundary conditions presented in the Treaty of Lisbon, this distribution cannot be 
taken into account in the design of the composition the European Parliament. 
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5. Summary 
Degressive proportionality has been legally approved as an idea distributing seats in the European Parliament. 
This was mainly because due to large diversity of populations of Member States both proportional allocation method 
and equal division proved useless. So the idea that somehow was a motto of proportional degression, saying “let's 
give the small more at the expense of the large, but not too much” must be refined so that it can actually be used in 
the subsequent terms of office of the European Parliament. One of the factors that may have an impact on reducing 
political bargaining accompanying each new Parliamentary elections can be the possibility to assign the degree of 
proportionality (and also the degree of equality) of the distributions. Then it will be possible to have a closer 
discussion on the proposed solutions from the mathematical perspective. The proposed measure of degression has a 
simple and clear interpretation. As its design is of general character, it can be used in any case where the allocation 
of goods was carried out on the basis of the degressive proportionality. Neither is it relevant whether there is a goods 
in question are divisible or indivisible. Of course, in case of indivisible goods achieving a strictly proportional 
division, ie, with the measure MD = 0, is often impossible due to necessary roundings. The MD measure show that 
the composition of the European Parliament during the term of 2014-2019 is the least proportional from the 
analyzed alternative distributions. For the proposed measure to be fully usable in constructing degressively 
proportional distributions all is characteristics must be thoroughly examined, which requires further research. 
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